Browsing through the Bank of Greece website i found a quite informative breakdown by country and currency of MFI balance sheet items. If one examines the data since December 2009 (when the Greek crisis mostly started) there are important conclusions to make.

First here’s the asset side:

It is clear that loans to other credit institutions are centered around Luxemburg, Cyprus (which has very close links with Greece due to a number of banks operating in both countries) and the UK. As far as non-credit institutions are involved, off-shore financial centers constitute the bulk of loans. One thing that is certain is the significant drop in loans to Cyprus banks after June 2010 with a fall from €40bn levels to €15bn on March 2012.

Shares and other equity are stable, while securities show a large drop of around €15bn, mostly due to lower holdings of UK originated securities.

On the liabilities side:

main creditors seem to be the UK, Cyprus, Luxemburg, France and Germany in the case of credit institutions and mainly the UK for non-MFIs. Cyprus and France seem to have maintained their credit flows (although France moved away in the last few months), while the rest of the countries decreased their exposure.

Things are much clearer when one nets assets and liabilities:

Net assets dropped strongly, mainly due to loans turning very negative. Germany quickly lowered its lending, while France maintained  its financing, probably due to commercial presence is Greece (they have started using ELA in the recent months). In the case of credit institutions, Luxemburg, Cyprus and the UK are actually net positive. Luxemburg kept a strong positive position during the whole period while Cyprus went from more than €28bn net positive to an almost complete elimination of net claims. The UK seems a bit erratic.

Non-MFIs were highly negative and increased substantially from €20.5bn before the crisis to a top of €59bn to settle around €40.4bn in March 2012. Almost all of the financing came from the UK, which seems to have been the main stabilizing force during the crisis, allowing the Greek banking system to incur large negative positions between €27-30bn, without having to resort to Bank of Greece lending.