So it seems that a European QE program is highly probable although Greek government debt is at risk of not being included since it is not rated investment grade and the ECB will only include it in the list of assets purchased if Greece remains in a refinancing program.
In this short post I ‘d like to note a few things on the magnitude of the impact that such a program would have on Greek bonds. Based on the Greek ECB capital key (2%) and the anticipated QE size (which most analysts put around €500bn), the ECB might end up buying around €10bn of Greek debt securities. PSI related bonds principal is now around €29.6bn while long-term bonds issued by the Greek government during 2014 totaled another €6.9bn. Bonds with a residual maturity of up to 10 years are only €12,2bn which, given current market prices, are worth much less than €10bn.
As a result, ECB will ultimately be making a bid for all the outstanding market value of long-term Greek bonds (with a residual maturity of up to 10 years), increasing liquidity in the bond market considerably (and making it the largest holder of Greek debt). That will obviously drive current market prices much higher and also allow the Greek government to immediately return to the market since bidders will have a (free) put option of selling most of their holdings to the ECB. As long as the upcoming QE is pari passu with private bondholders (as is the OMT program) and the Greek government establishes a credit line program (which creates another put option for bondholders) the (QE) program will allow an orderly return of the Greek government to private bond markets.
Since the Greek debt maturity profile suggests that only mostly 2015 and 2019 are years that involve large debt refinancing needs (which lowers any default risk post 2015) a QE program will have long-lasting stabilization effects. These effects will be even higher if ECB profits from the program are returned to the corresponding Treasuries (which I suspect will happen if eventually the program involves each NCB buying its own government debt securities).
Personally I would also like to see a second buyback of Greek debt to take advantage of low market prices and also to lower the nominal value of post-PSI bonds which, due to the EFSF co-financing scheme, are senior to newer bonds issued by the Greek government (a fact that can create difficulties for Greece issuing bonds that have similar maturity dates as outstanding PSI bonds). A possible buyback could be combined with an exchange offer to consolidate the current series (which stretch a 20 year period with low nominal values per bond of less than €1.5bn) into two or three securities that will be of much larger nominal value and liquidity and thus improve market making and secondary market trading.